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Abstract—We design and analyze the performance of a redun-
dancy management mechanism for Peer-to-Peer backup appli-
cations. Armed with the realization that a backup system has
peculiar requirements – namely, data is read over the network
only during restore processes caused by data loss – redundancy
management targets data durability rather than attempting to
make each piece of information availabile at any time.
In our approach each peer determines, in an on-line manner,
an amount of redundancy sufficient to counter the effects of
peer deaths, while preserving acceptable data restore times. Our
experiments, based on trace-driven simulations, indicate that our
mechanism can reduce the redundancy by a factor between two
and three with respect to redundancy policies aiming for data
availability. These results imply an according increase in storage
capacity and decrease in time to complete backups, at the expense
of longer times required to restore data. We believe this is a very
reasonable price to pay, given the nature of the application.
We complete our work with a discussion on practical issues,
and their solutions, related to which encoding technique is more
suitable to support our scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
Online storage solutions are an extremely successful way
of sharing and syncronizing data between machines, taking
advantage of the ubiquity of Internet connectivity. Dropbox,
Google Drive and Microsoft SkyDrive are only a few widely
used examples within the plethora of applications that give
this kind of service.
The above mentioned applications adopt a centralized
“cloud” architecture, with all data residing on the data centers
of a single vendor. Despite its success, such an architecture
has some intrinsic shortcomings. Some of them have already
shown up in news: data loss due to correlated failures [1],
security blunders due to configuration errors [2]. Others, such
as data theft from rogue employees, might happen eventually.
Also, we argue that long-term storage is a case where the
weaknesses of centralized storage are most important: indeed,
the costs of storing large amounts of data over long periods
are high, and services might shut down in the future as already
happened to Drop.io [3], making data availability in the long
run essentially impossible to evaluate.
Peer-to-peer (P2P) storage could solve these problems,
providing cheap storage leveraging on excess bandwidth and
disk space at the edge of the network. However, despite a
considerable amount of research, P2P storage solutions failed
to reach widespread usage. Indeed, implementing a generic
P2P storage application requires dealing with a variety of
challenging problems, such as scalable handling of metadata,
dealing efficiently with maintenance due to disk crashes, low-
latency access and modification to individual files, and security
issues such as ensuring data confidentiality even when usage
permissions change dynamically. In this setting, maintaining
data availability in a situation of high churn is a daunting
task [4].
We take a pragmatic approach: rather than trying to solve
all the aforementioned issues at once and come up with a
generic P2P file-system for the Internet, we design a system
exclusively for data backup. Indeed, we argue that backup is
a widely needed application that better fits the characteristics
provided by P2P architectures. Costs and poor usability are
among the main reasons why many existing backup solutions
are not used: a P2P approach to data backup can be a viable
technique to overcome such issues.
For backup applications, as we discuss in Section II, the
focus shifts from data availability to durability, which amounts
to guaranteeing that data is not lost. The requirements for a
specialized backup application are less stringent than those of
generic storage in several aspects. First, backups should only
be readable by their owner; this makes confidentiality require-
ments easy to satisfy with standard cryptographic techniques.
Second, data backup often involves the bulk transfer of poten-
tially large quantities of data, both during regular backups and,
in the event of data loss, during restore operations. Therefore,
read and write latencies of hours have to be tolerated by users.
Third, owners have access to the original copy of their data,
making it easy to inject additional redundancy in case data
stored remotely is partially lost. Fourth, since data is read
only during restore operations, the application does not need
to guarantee that any piece of the original data should be
promptly accessible in any moment, as long as the time needed
to restore the whole backup remains under control.
In this work, we design and evaluate a new redundancy
management mechanism tailored to backup applications. Sim-
ply stated, the problem of redundancy management amounts
to computing the necessary redundancy level to be applied to
backup data to achieve durability. The endeavor of this work
is to design a mechanism that achieves data durability without
requiring high redundancy levels nor fast mechanisms to detect
node failures. Our solution to the problem stems from the
particular data access workload of backup applications: data
is written once and read rarely. The gist of our redundancy
management mechanism, which is described in Section III, is
that the redundancy level applied to backup data is computed
in an on-line manner. Given a time window, that accounts for
failure detection and data repair delays, and a system-wide
statistic on peer deaths, a peer determines the redundancy
rate during the backup phase. A byproduct of our approach
is that, if the system state changes, then peers can adapt to
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2such dynamics and modify the redundancy level on the fly.
The ability to compute the redundancy level in an on-line
manner requires solving several problems related to coding
efficiency and data management. In Section IV, we show
how our scheme can be realized in practice, exploiting the
properties of Fountain Coding.
Finally, we evaluate our redundancy management scheme
using trace-driven simulations. In Section V, we show that our
approach drastically decreases strain on resources, reducing
the storage and bandwidth requirements by a factor between
two and three, as compared to redundancy schemes that use
a fixed, system-wide redundancy factor. This result yields
augmented storage capacity for the system and decreased
backup times, at the expense of increased restore times, which
is a reasonable price to pay if the specific requirements of
backup applications are taken into account.
II. APPLICATION SCENARIO
Similarly to many online backup applications, we assume
users (referred to as data owners) to specify one local folder
containing important data to backup. Note that backup data
remains available locally to data owners. This is an important
trait that distinguishes backup from many online storage
applications, in which data is only stored remotely.
We consider here the problem of long-term storage of large,
immutable, and opaque pieces of data that we term backup
objects. They consist of encrypted archives of changes to sets
of files, such that recovering them allows reconstructing the
history of data in the backup folder. We do not take into
account the short-term storage of small modifications to the
backup folder, which can be handled using known centralized
or decentralized online storage solutions.
Backup objects are stored on remote peers, which are
inherently unreliable. Peers may join and leave the system
at any time, as part of their short-term online behavior: in the
literature, this is referred to as churn. Moreover, peers may
crash and possibly abandon the P2P application: this behavior
is generally referred to as peer death. As such, the online
behavior of peers must be continuously tracked, since it cannot
be determined a priori [5].
While the literature provides a vast array of solutions to
guarantee data availability when using failure-prone machines
to store data [5], [6], we claim that online data backup
applications should instead target data durability. Moreover,
backup applications often involve the bulk transfer of a large
quantity of data. Therefore, such applications should cater
throughput rather than aiming at low-latency read operations,
in addition to be resilient against peer churn and deaths.
Similarly to data availability, data durability can be achieved
by injecting a sufficient level of redundancy in the system.
One key issue to address is to determine the redundancy level
required to make sure data is not lost, despite peer churn. This
problem is called redundancy management. A closely related
problem is to deal with peer deaths, which cause the data
redundancy level to drop. Hence, the focus of our work is to
design a redundancy management mechanism that is tailored
to the peculiar data access patterns of backup applications and
that strives for data durability.
For the sake of clarity, we now explain the operation of
a baseline P2P backup application. We gloss over the details
of how data redundancy is achieved and discuss the salient
phases of the life-time of backup data.
Using erasure coding, a backup object of size o is encoded
in n fragments of a fixed size f which are ready to be placed
on remote peers. Any k out of n fragments are sufficient
to recover the original data;1 when using optimal erasure
coding techniques, k = do/fe. The redundancy management
mechanism determines the redundancy level r = nf/o.
During the backup phase, data owners upload fragments
to some selected remote peers. We assume that any peer
can collect a list of remote peers with available storage
space: this can be achieved with known techniques, e.g. a
central coordinator or a decentralized data structure such as
a distributed hash table. The backup phase completes when
all n fragments are placed on remote peers.
Once the backup phase is completed, the maintenance
phase begins. The purpose of this phase is to reestablish the
desired redundancy level in the system, that may decrease
due to peer deaths: new fragments must be re-injected in the
system. The crux of data maintenance is to determine when
the redundancy of the backup object is too low to allow data
recovery and to generate other fragments to rebalance it. In the
event of a peer death, the system may trigger the maintenance
phase immediately (eager repairs) or may wait for a number
of fragments to be tagged as lost before proceeding with the
repairs (lazy repairs) [5], [7], [8]. As such, it is important
to discern unambiguously permanent deaths from the normal
online behavior of peers: this is generally achieved by setting
a time-out value, Θ, for long-term peer unavailability.
Note that, as peers hold a local copy of their data, mainte-
nance can be executed solely by the data owner, or (as often
done in storage systems) it can be delegated. In both cases, it
is important to consider the timeframe in which data cannot be
maintained. First, fragments may be lost before a host failure
is detected using the time-out mechanism outlined above. This
problem is exacerbated by the availability pattern of the entity
(data owner or other peers) in charge of the maintenance
operation: indeed, host failures cannot be detected during
the offline periods. Second, data loss can occur during the
restore process. For this reason, in Section III, we consider
a redundancy management policy that ensures data is not
lost in the time-window w = Θ + aoff , where aoff is the
(largest) transient off-line period of the entity in charge of
data maintenance. For example, if the data owner executes
data maintenance: first, it needs to be on-line to generate new
fragments and upload them, and second, the timeout Θ has to
be expired. Additionally, our mechanism selects a redundancy
level such that data loss does not occur before the restore
process is completed.
In the unfortunate case of a disk or host crash, the restore
phase takes place. Data owners contact the remote machines
holding their fragments, download at least k of them, and
reconstruct the original backup data.
1For non-optimal erasure-coding techniques such as Fountain Coding, as
described in Section IV, this guarantee is given probabilistically.
3Before proceeding, we now define the performance metrics
we are interested in for this work. Overall, we compute the
performance of a P2P backup application in terms of the
amount of time required to complete the backup and the restore
phases, labelled time to backup (TTB) and time to restore
(TTR). Moreover, in the following sections, we use baseline
values for backup and restore operations which bound both
TTB and TTR. We compute such bounds as follows: let us
assume an ideal storage system with unlimited capacity and
uninterrupted online time that backs up user data. In this case,
TTB and TTR only depend on the size of a backup object
and on uplink bandwidth and availability of the data owner.
We label these ideal values minTTB and minTTR. Formally,
we have that a peer i with upload and download bandwidth
ui and di, starting the backup of an object of size o at time
t, completes its backup at time t′, after having spent oui time
online. Analogously, i restores a backup object with the same
size at t′′ after having spent odi time online. Hence, we have
that
minTTB(i, t) = t′ − t
and
minTTR(i, t) = t′′ − t.
We use these reference values throughout the paper to compare
the relative performance of our P2P application versus that of
such an ideal system.
III. REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT
We now discuss the key idea of our work: a redundancy
management mechanism to achieve data durability. In practice,
data can be considered as durable if the probability to lose
it, due to the permanent failure of hosts in the system, is
negligible. The problem of designing a system that guarantees
data durability can be approached under different angles.
As noted in previous works [9], [10], data availability
implies data durability: a system that injects sufficient redun-
dancy for data to be available at any time, coupled with main-
tenance mechanisms, automatically achieves data durability.
These solutions are, however, too expensive in our scenario:
the amount of redundancy needed to guarantee availability is
much higher than what needed to obtain durability.
Instead of using high redundancy, data durability can also be
achieved with efficient maintenance techniques. For example,
in a datacenter, each host is continuously monitored: based on
statistics such as the mean time to failure of machines and
their components, it is possible to store data with very little
redundancy and rely on system monitoring to detect and react
immediately to host failures. Failed machines are replaced
and data is rapidly repaired due to the dedicated and over-
dimensioned nature of datacenter networks. Unfortunately, this
approach is not feasible in a P2P setting. First, the interplay
of transient and permanent failures makes failure detection a
difficult task. Since it is difficult to discern deaths from the
ordinary online behavior of peers, the detection of permanent
failures requires a delay during which data may be lost.
Furthermore, data maintenance is not immediate: in a P2P
application deployed on the Internet, bandwidth scarceness and
peer churn make the repair operation slow.
In summary: on the one hand durability could be achieved
with high data redundancy, but the cost in terms of resources
required by peers would be overwhelming. On the other hand,
with little redundancy, durability could be achieved with timely
detection of host failures and fast repairs, which are not
realistic in a P2P setting.
The endeavor of this work is to design a redundancy
management mechanism that achieves data durability without
requiring high redundancy levels nor fast failure detection and
repair mechanisms. Our solution to the problem stems from
the particular data access workload of backup applications:
data is written once, during backup, and read (hopefully)
rarely, during restores. Hence, we design a mechanism that
injects only the data redundancy level required to compensate
failure detection and data repair delays. That is, we define data
durability as follows.
Definition 1. Data durability d is the probability to be able
to access data after a time window t, during which no
maintenance operations can be executed.
Definition 2. The time window t is defined as t = w+TTR,
where w accounts for failure detection delays and TTR is the
time required to download a number of fragments sufficient to
recover the original data.
As discussed in Section II, w depends on whether the
maintenance is executed by the data owner or is delegated,
and can be thought of a parameter of our scheme.
The goal of our redundancy management mechanism is
to determine the data redundancy that achieves a target data
durability: we proceed as follows. A peer with n fragments
placed on remote peers could lose its data if more than n− k
of them would get lost as well within the time window t. The
data redundancy required to avoid this event is r = n/k.
Peer deaths can be determined by disks and host crashes,
or by human events such as users uninstalling the application
and leaving the network. Disk drives in practical settings have
a lifetime of several years on average [11]; in the evaluation
section, we will evaluate our strategies in challenging sitiations
where peer lifetime ranges between a few months and a few
years. Let us assume peer deaths to be memoryless events,
with constant probability for any peer and at any time. Peer
lifetimes are exponentially distributed stochastic variables with
a parametric average τ . Hence, the probability for a peer to
be alive after a time t is e−t/τ . Assuming death events are
independent, data durability writes as:
d =
n∑
i=k
(
n
i
)(
e−t/τ
)i (
1− e−t/τ
)n−i
. (1)
Equation 1 depends on t which, in turn, is a function of
TTR. However, peers cannot readily compute their TTR, as
this quantity depends on the characteristics of remote peers
hosting their fragments. We thus propose to use the following
heuristic as a method to estimate the TTR. Suppose peer p0 is
computing an estimate of its TTR. In the event of a crash, we
assume p0 to remain online during the whole restore process.
In such a case, assuming no network bottlenecks, its TTR can
be bounded for two reasons:
41) the download bandwidth D0 of peer p0 is the bottleneck;
2) the upload rate of remote peers holding p0’s data is the
bottleneck.
Let us focus on the second case: we define the expected upload
rate µi of a generic remote peer pi holding a backup fragment
of p0 as the product of the availability of peer pi and its upload
bandwidth, that is µi = uiai.
Peer p0 needs to download at least k fragments to fully
recover a backup object. Let us assume these k fragments are
served by the k remote peers with the highest expected upload
rate µi. In this case, the “bottleneck” is the k-th peer with the
lowest expected upload rate µk. Then, an estimation of TTR,
that we label eTTR, can be obtained as follows:
eTTR = max
(
o
D0
,
o
kµk
)
. (2)
We now set off to describe how our redundancy manage-
ment scheme works in practice: the redundancy level applied
to backup data is computed by the combination of Equation 1
and Equation 2. Let us assume, for the sake of simplicity, the
presence of a central coordinator that performs membership
management of the P2P network: the coordinator keeps track
of users subscribed to the application, along with short-term
measurements of their availability, their (application-level)
uplink capacity and the average death rate τ in the system.
While a decentralized approach to membership management
and system monitoring is an appealing research subject, it
is common practice (e.g., Wuala2) to rely on a centralized
infrastructure and a simple heartbeat mechanism.
During a backup operation, peers query the coordinator to
obtain remote hosts that can be used to store fragments, along
with their availability. A peer constructs a backup object, and
subsequently uploads k fragments to distinct, randomly se-
lected available remote hosts. Then the peer continues to inject
redundancy in the system, by sending additional fragments to
randomly selected available peers, until a stop condition is
met. Every time one (or more) new fragment is uploaded, the
peer computes d and eTTR: the stop condition is met if d ≥ σ1
and eTTR ≤ σ2. While selecting an appropriate σ1 is trivial,
in the following we define σ2 as σ2 = α ·minTTR, where
α is a parameter that specifies the degradation of TTR with
respect to an ideal system, tolerated by users.
We now discuss in details the influence of the two stop con-
ditions on the behavior of our mechanism. Given Equation 1,
we study the impact of the ratio w+eTTRτ :
• τ  w+eTTR: this case is representative of a “mature”
P2P application in which the dominant factor that char-
acterizes peer deaths are permanent host failures, rather
than users abandoning the system. Hence, the exponential
in Equation 1 is close to 1, which implies that the target
durability σ1 can be achieved with a small n.
As such, the condition on eTTR ≤ σ2 prevails on d ≥ σ1
in determining the redundancy level to apply to backup
data. This means that the accuracy of the estimate eTTR
plays an important role in guaranteeing acceptable restore
2http://www.wuala.com
times; instead, errors on eTTR have no impact on data
durability.
• τ ∼ w + eTTR: this case is representative of a P2P
application in the early stages of its deployment, where
the abandon rate of users is crucial in determining the
death rate. In this case, the exponential in Equation 1
can be arbitrarily small, which implies that n  k, i.e.,
the target durability d requires higher data redundancy.
In this case, the condition d ≥ σ1 prevails on eTTR ≤
σ2. Hence, estimation errors on the restore times may
have an impact on data durability: e.g., underestimating
the TTR may cause n to be too small to guarantee the
target σ1. In Section V, we study this scenario.
In summary, the key idea of our redundancy management
mechanism is that the redundancy level applied to backup data
is computed in an on-line manner, during the backup phase.
This comes in sharp contrast to computing the redundancy
level in an off-line manner, solely based on system-wide
statistics, that characterize previous approaches to redundancy
management.
A by-product of our approach is that our mechanism can
adapt the redundancy rate r each peer applies to its data
based on system dynamics. Now, we must prove that the
system reaches a stable state: system dynamics must not bring
the redundancy mechanism to oscillate around r. Based on
Equation 1 and Equation 2, we face a retroactive system in
which a feedback loop exists on the durability d. Given a target
durability d, a system-wide average death rate τ and a time
window t = w+ eTTR, we can derive r. The problem is that
eTTR depends on the short-term behavior of peers as well as
the redundancy rate r.
First, we study how eTTR and d vary as a function of the
redundancy rate r.
Proposition 1. eTTR is a non-increasing function in r.
Sketch of the proof: Recall that r = nfo . Let us assume a peer
p0 has the following ranked list of remote peers:
{µ1, µ2, µ3, ..., µk},
where, without loss of generality, µi < µj ∀i < j. If r
increases, then n increases: new fragments must be stored on
new remote peers. For simplicity, assume a single fragment is
to be placed on peer pq .
Two cases can happen:
1) µq > µk; in this case, eTTR remains unvaried, since pq
is “slower” than the k-th peer used to compute eTTR;
2) µq < µk; in this case, pq “ejects” the current k-th peer
from the ranked list defined above.
As such, eTTR can only decrease. Note that eTTR may
not reach the stop condition σ2 if the parameter α is not
appropriately chosen: simply stated, a plateau value of eTTR
exists when placing fragments on all peers in the network.
Proposition 2. d is an increasing function in r.
Sketch of the proof: Equation 1 is a composite function of
eTTR. Hence, by increasing r, new fragments have to be
placed on remote peers and it is not guaranteed, in general,
5that this contributes to decrease d. However, thanks to Propo-
sition 1, eTTR is non-decreasing in r, hence t = w + eTTR
is non decreasing in r. As a consequence, d is an increasing
function in r.
We can now state the following Proposition:
Proposition 3. The redundancy management mechanism pre-
sented in this section is stable.
Sketch of the proof: By design, our redundancy mechanism
shall only increase r. Now, Proposition 1 states that increasing
r yields lower values of eTTR, hence, eventually, the system
either arrives at the stop condition eTTR ≤ σ2, when α is
chosen appropriately, or it reaches the plateau defined above.
Similarly, by Proposition 2, increasing the redundancy in the
system implies that d grows asymptotically to 1, hence the
system eventually reaches the stop condition d ≥ σ1.
It is natural to question why in Proposition 3 we omit the
possibility of removing fragments from remote peers if r is too
high. Let us consider such an operation: one possibility would
be to drop a remote fragment at random. This operation would
be unstable: indeed, for example, deleting a fragment from the
“fastest” peer in the ranked list defined above would increase
eTTR, decrease d, which as a consequence might require to re-
inject a fragment. Instead, we could delete fragments starting
from the “slowest” peer: in this case, the drop operation
would be stable, but the storage load in the system may
eventually become concentrated on fast peers only. Moreover,
avoiding deletions can spare maintenance operations in the
future should one or more of the remaining fragments on
remote peers be lost. Due to these reasons, in this work we
do not allow fragments to be dropped.
IV. CODING AND DATA MANAGEMENT
With the redundancy management mechanism described
in Section III, the redundancy level applied to backup data
is computed in an on-line manner. Instead, the redundancy
rate used in most related work is usually computed off-
line, given sufficiently representative statistics on the system,
including transient and non-transient failures. These system-
wide statistics are used to compute a unique redundancy rate
that every peer will use. Instead, our approach requires each
peer to compute an individual redundancy level: the time
window t is a function of eTTR, which is different for every
peer.
The endeavor of this Section is to study the practical
implications that stem from adopting two families of coding
algorithms to implement our redundancy management mecha-
nism. Indeed, linear coding techniques assume data fragments
to be grouped in blocks and each block to be processed
separately to create redundancy. The block size depends on the
application requirements and on the coding technique used.
In the context of incremental backup, the high number of
initial fragments, the always increasing amount of data and
its generation rate make the block size play an important role
in the system design. Given the complexity of the topic and
the space constraints, in this paper we will consider the backup
object to be composed of different coding blocks of the same
size.
We remark that we have implemented a library in C (with
Python wrappers) of the coding technique described in Sec-
tion IV-B. This library is a core component of a prototype P2P
backup application that we are currently testing in a synthetic
environment.
A. Optimal Erasure Coding
Erasure coding introduces data redundancy by transforming
an original file composed of fragments into a longer file such
that the original file can be recovered from a subset of the en-
coded fragments. More formally, assuming the backup object
to be segmented in blocks of k fragments each, each portion
of the original data will be recovered if a sufficient number
of the n encoded fragments will be successfully received.
An erasure code is optimal if any k out of the n encoded
fragments are sufficient to recover the original block. The code
rate3 is defined as r = n/k and represents the number of
“redundant” fragments per “useful” fragments generated by
the encoder. Note that optimal codes are often costly when n
is large: practical solutions usually have quadratic encoding
and decoding complexity.
Among the optimal techniques, Reed-Solomon (RS) codes
are the most widely used. A RS code is defined by the couple
of parameters k and n, which are fixed a priori and and are
systematic, i.e., the RS encoded data consists of k original
fragments and n− k encoded fragments.
There are several implications due to the lack of flexibility
of RS codes. First, the coding rate must be computed off-
line, which poses a fundamental challenge to use them as
a base for our redundancy mechanism. Furthermore, any
change in the redundancy level resulting from system dy-
namics, entails a complete re-initialization of the encoder:
thus, coding/decoding operations are strictly dependent on the
specific configuration of the RS scheme. Additional compli-
cations arise when considering repair operations. Since each
RS encoded fragment is unique, the entity in charge of data
maintenance (the data owner in our case) must maintain
metadata information concerning which remote peer store
which encoded fragment.
In case a repair is needed, the data owner must repair exactly
the lost encoded fragment. In the following, we will outline
several techniques that can be used to overcome the limitations
of RS codes when applied to our setting.
The problem of achieving a redundancy level in the system
that is determined in an on-line manner can be addressed
simply as follows. The encoder can be parametrized by
“overshooting” the coding rate: as such a (k, n) RS-code
becomes a (k, n′) RS-code with n′ > n. Note that the RS
coding matrix discussed above need not be generated all at
once: additional rows can be computed when required. In
practice, with reference to the adaptive mechanism discussed
in Section III, we can choose a large n′, place k encoded frag-
ments on remote hosts, then incrementally inject redundancy
in the system until the stop condition is met. Furthermore, as
3In this work, code rate and redundancy rate are used as synonyms.
6long as n′ is sufficiently high, our redundancy management
mechanism can inject more redundancy in the system, or drop
excess fragments, if required. Assuming that a value of n′
large enough can be found, the price to pay is a substantial
bookkeeping effort to store metadata information about which
encoded fragments are available in the system.
The technique described above allows to overcome the lim-
itations on the number of encoded fragments to be generated,
but does not solve the limitation on the source size. In fact,
the number of fragments to backup can vary, which suggest
to break the backup object into several coding blocks. This
allows to encode separately blocks of data and to tune their
redundancy independently.
This approach is convenient when a certain encoded portion
of the backup object has low redundancy. In this case, only
the blocks associated to that portion of data will be considered
for the generation of the new encoded fragments, resulting in
an improvement of coding speed (being the block size smaller
than the one that would contain the whole backup object). The
drawback of this approach is that enough fragments of every
encoding block have to be received. As a consequence, this
approach is prone to burst loss – that is, the loss of several
fragments beloning to the same encoding block – which could
make the recovery phase to fail.
The burst loss problem can be addressed using a well known
technique in digital communications: block interleaving. In
words, interleaving amounts to defining two levels of granular-
ity to partition backup data. The boundary of a backup block
is defined such that for each block, only few fragments k are
required. Moreover, with block interleaving, the parameters
that govern the RS coding scheme can be independent of the
size of a backup object.
Although interleaving techniques help mitigating the lim-
itations of RS codes, their efficient use presents non trivial
challenges. In fact, in order to minimize the padding, RS
blocks of different sizes can be used. Unfortunately this means
that the erasure protection capability will be different for
different segments of the backup object. Another common
problem of using interleaving techniques is the memory con-
sumption. This means that the received fragments have to be
processed all together, thus increasing the processing time and
the memory requirements.
B. Fountain Codes
Fountain Codes have been vastly studied in the literature,
with applications to digital communications [12], content
delivery [13], storage [14] and P2P [15]. This family of
codes is particularly suitable to our goals because of its
unique characteristics. The generation of an encoded fragment
is independent from the others (on-the-fly property) and the
number of encoded fragments that can be generated from the
original data is potentially infinite (rateless property).
Fountain Codes are not optimal, in the sense that the number
of encoded fragments necessary to recover the original data
is slightly larger than the original number of fragments. This
inefficiency depends on the parameters of the coding technique
and on the block size4 and is negligible for large data blocks.
In practice, the loss of efficiency is acceptable, if one considers
the increased computational efficiency (even linear with the
block size) of this family of codes with respect to RS codes
(typically quadratic).
In the context of this work, Fountain Codes are very simple
to use in practice. Indeed, the information about the fragment
generation should be shared between the encoder and the
decoder.5 Instead, in our application, the encoder and the
decoder coexist in the same entity: the data owner. Hence,
such information needs not a complex infrastructure to be set
up between separate communicating parties, but can be simply
treated as “metadata” information to be stored locally (and
eventually backed up).
Fountain Codes make the mechanism described in Sec-
tion III trivial to achieve: as long as the conditions on the
eTTR and d are not met, the encoder continues to generate
new unique encoded fragments on the fly. When the stop
condition is reached, the encoding process terminates. In
case system dynamics trigger the generation of new encoded
fragments (e.g. because host availability decreases), these can
be simply generated as needed, with the same procedure
described above. If the redundancy level in the system exceeds
what is required (e.g. because host availability increases), any
encoded fragment can be deleted.
Fountain encoded fragments are statistically “interchange-
able”: any encoded fragment can be used to reconstruct the
original data and any encoded fragment can be replaced by
any newly generated encoded fragments. As a consequence,
also maintenance operations are simplified as peers need not
track of the exact encoded fragment to replace.
Another appealing characteristic of Fountain Codes is that,
unlike RS codes, the block size is not mathematically con-
strained. Nevertheless, a solution based on Fountain Codes
is not exempt from data management problems. While these
codes allow maximum flexibility, the definition of the block
size is a tradeoff between the coding inefficiency (which
suggests to use large blocks) and the number of operations
required for either encoding or decoding (even if linear-
time implementations exist, memory and delay considerations
suggest to use shorter blocks). This means that given a poten-
tially large backup object, what is the best strategy, encoding
the whole data thus minimizing the coding inefficiency, or
segmenting into smaller blocks decreasing the complexity?
We argue that the data object should be partitioned in
several blocks whose size should depend not only on coding
complexity and inefficiency, but also on the user data gener-
ation rate. One of the coding strategies that can increase the
performance of the code whilst maintaining shorter block size
is the sliding-windowing approach [16], [17]. This approach
virtually increases the encoding block by allowing the overlap
of two or more subsequent coding blocks (referred as “win-
dows”). The block overlap is a design parameter that impacts
4In the context of Fountain Codes, the encoding block is defined exclusively
by the number of fragments k, n not being defined a priori.
5This information can be transmitted together with the encoded fragment,
or the choice of the degree distribution and the random generator can be
shared.
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Fig. 1. Ratio of connected nodes in a representative week of the availability
trace. More users are connected during days than during night; in weekends,
the total number of connected users drops.
the performance of the code and its value can be decided
a priori or according to customized coding strategies. The
typical drawback of using the sliding-windowing approach is
an increase in the decoding delay and memory consumption.
However, for the considered application, if the block size is
moderate, their impacts are acceptable.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In the following, we proceed with a trace-driven system
simulation, and focus on the performance metrics outlined
in Section II. That is, we are interested in studying the
time required to backup and restore user data: we perform
a comparative study of the results achieved by a system
using our redundancy management scheme and the traditional
approach used for storage applications. For the latter case, we
implement a technique in which the coding rate is set once and
for all based on a system-wide average of host availability.
Note that, for the purpose of our study, it is not necessary
to implement in detail the coding mechanisms described in
Section IV. All we need to know for the evaluation of transfer
times is the number of fragments each peer has to upload
during the backup operation.
We use traces as input to our simulator that cover both
the online behavior of peers and their uplink and downlink
capacities. Instead, long-term failures and the events of peers
abandoning the applications, which constitute the peer deaths,
follow a simple model driven by the parameter τ , as explained
in Section III. Due to the lack of traces that represent the real-
istic “data production rate” of Internet users, in this simulation
study we confine our attention to a homogeneous setting: each
user has an individual backup object of the same size.
A. Datasets
Availability trace: The online behavior of users, i.e.,
their patterns of connection and disconnection over time, is
difficult to capture analytically. In this work we simulate a
backup application using a real application trace that exhibits
both heterogeneity and correlated user behavior. Our traces
capture user availability, in terms of login/logoff events, from
an instant messaging (IM) server for a duration of roughly
3 months. We argue that the behavior of regular IM users
constitutes a representative case study. Indeed, for both an
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Fig. 2. CDF of the host availability from our traces. Note that users spending
less than 4 hours per day online are filtered from our data.
IM and an online backup application, users are generally
signed in for as long as their machine is connected to the
Internet; as it can be gleaned from Figure 1, in this dataset
it is possible to observe strong diurnal and weekly patterns.
Moreover, users have heterogeneous behavior – for example,
some users often stay connected during workdays while others
have a less predictable uptime [18].
In this work we only consider users that are online for an
average of at least four hours per day, as done in Wuala [19].
Once this filter is applied, we obtain the trace of 376 users.
Since in P2P storage systems the number of neighbors each
node interacts with is very often limited by design and
scalability issues [20], we believe this trace size is acceptable.
As shown in Figure 2, most users are online for less than 40%
of the trace length, while some of them are almost always
connected.
Bandwidth distribution: Uplink capacities of peers are
obtained by sampling a real bandwidth distribution measured
at more than 300,000 unique Internet hosts for a 48 hour period
from roughly 3,500 distinct ASes across 160 countries [21].
These values have a highly skewed distribution, with a median
of 77 KBps and a mean of 428 KBps. To represent typical
asymmetric residential Internet lines, we assign to each peer
a downlink speed equal to four times its uplink.
B. Simulation Settings
The trace-driven online behavior of a peer is overridden only
during the restore phase: in this work we make the assumption
that in such case, a peer remains online for the whole duration
of the restore process.
In our study, each peer has o = 10 GB of data to backup
(as soon as the simulation begins), and dedicates 50 GB of
storage space to the application. The high ratio between these
two values lets us disregard issues due to insufficient storage
capacity and focus on the subjects of our investigation. The
fragment size is set to 160 MB, implying a minimum of k =
64 fragments needed for restores.
We define peers’ lifetimes to be exponentially dis-
tributed random variables with an expected value τ =
8{90 days, 1 year, 4 years}, conservative values that are no-
ticeably lower than the disk failure rates measured in real-
world scenarios [11] (see Section III). Besides peer deaths,
we study the impact of the w parameter, which contributes
to the duration of the time-window for which our redundancy
management policy guarantees data durability, without main-
tenance (see Section III). As a reminder (see Section II), w
accounts for failure detection delays. In our experiments w
takes values from 0 to 4 weeks.
Our adaptive redundancy policy uses the following parame-
ters: we set the thresholds σ1 = 0.9999, so that the durability
d ≥ σ1 and σ2 ≤ max (1 day, 2 ·minTTR) so that the
estimated TTR eTTR ≤ σ2. In this work, we compare against
a baseline redundancy policy that aims to guarantee data
availability [5], labeled here as “availability-based”. Here we
set a target data availability of t = 0.99, and use the system-
wide average availability a = 0.36 as computed from our
availability traces. Hence, we obtain a value n = 228 and a
redundancy rate n/k = 3.56.
For each set of parameters, the simulation results are ob-
tained by averaging ten simulation runs.
C. Results
We begin our discussion by showing the bounds on TTB
and TTR, as defined in Section II. Figure 3 shows the cumu-
lative distribution functions (CDF) of minTTB and minTTR
obtained using the input traces discussed above. Our working
assumption is that peers stay online during restore operations:
as such, only the (ordinary) backup phase suffers from peer
unavailability, and the distribution of minTTR depends only
on the bandwidth distribution, while minTTB also depends on
the availability traces.
While backup operations generally take days to complete,
for a file size of 10 GB, restore operations are several
times faster. This can be simply explained by the asymmetric
bandwidth setup we use in our simulations, and – as discussed
above – by unavailability of peers when data needs to be
backed up. Since node bandwidth distribution is skewed, a
few nodes with very large bandwidth experience a much lower
value for both minTTR and minTTB; the tails with a very
long minTTB value are instead due to peers that remained
disconnected for very long time spans in our traces.
We now proceed to a detailed comparative study of our
scheme to the traditional fixed-redundancy scheme. First, we
focus on the data redundancy level (that is, the code rate r)
imposed by each approach.
In Figure 4, we show the average redundancy factor for our
mechanism and the one computed for the availability-based
scheme (which is fixed), as a function of the parameter w
and for different values of τ . We omit error bars from the
plot as the variance around the mean is negligible. Clearly,
for increasing values of w the redundancy rate increases,
as it is possible to evince from Equation 1. Note that our
simulations account for a realistic bandwidth distribution and
for some real on-line user behavior, which influence the eTTR
computation. Figure 4 also illustrates the impact of τ : when
the dominant effect of non-transient failures is the reliability of
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Fig. 3. CDF of the ideal times to transfer data: minTTB and minTTR.
Internet hosts, that is τ is large, our mechanism achieves data
durability (and a controlled TTR) with a small redundancy
factor. Instead, when peer deaths are dominated by peers
abandoning the system, that is τ is small, our mechanism
compensates with a larger redundancy rate. In summary, our
redundancy management scheme obtains a redundancy factor
ranging roughly between half and a third of the availability-
based scheme, increasing the storage capacity of the system
by a corresponding factor between two and three. Since the
amount of data to upload in case of a disk crash is proportional
to the redundancy level, the impact of maintenance of system
bandwidth decreases accordingly.
In addition to improving the aggregate storage capacity
of the system, our redundancy management scheme impacts
both backup and restore operations. Figure 5 and 6 report the
CDF of the ratio of TTB and TTR over their respective ideal
counterparts, minTTB and minTTR. These plots are obtained
with different values of w, for a fixed τ = 3 months,6 and
illustrate the results of our mechanism and that achieved by
the availability-based scheme. Figure 5 indicates that, due to a
6We present results for τ = 3 months because the effects of w are more
marked. We obtain similar qualitative results for larger values of τ . Also, for
clarity of presentation, we omit the CDF for w = 4 weeks.
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Fig. 4. Redundancy rate as a function of w, for different values of τ .
9lower redundancy factor, the median of the distribution of TTB
is roughly reduced by a factor of four. Moreover, increasing
values of w have essentially little impact on TTB. The price
to pay for fast backup operations is shown in Figure 6: restore
operations take more time to complete w.r.t. a traditional
approach to redundancy management. Here the parameter w
plays an important role: for small w values, little redundancy
is applied to backup data. As such, the opportunity to retrieve
enough encoded fragments to restore data is largely affected by
peer availability. Instead, when w is large, restore operations
are more efficient and less sensitive to peer availability.
In summary, our results support the rationale underlying
the design of our redundancy management scheme: TTB is
generally several times larger than TTR, even in an ideal case
(as shown in Figure 3). Because of this unbalance, we argue
that it is reasonable to use a redundancy management scheme
that trades longer TTR (which affects only users that suffer a
crash) for shorter TTB (which affects all users).
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Now, we delve into the details of our scheme and study its
sensitivity to errors due to the heuristic we use to estimate
TTR. The main reason for errors on eTTR are due to the fact
that the heuristic defined in Equation 2 assumes k encoded
fragments to be downloaded from the k fastest peers that hold
backup data. In practice, however, the k encoded fragments
are downloaded from the peers that are available when a
restore operation is executed. Depending on the bandwidth
distribution of the peers in the system, such difference can
cause the estimated TTR value to be different from what
achieved in practice.
Now, if eTTR is larger than TTR, more redundant data
is injected in the system, which has no negative impact on
data durability. What is the impact on durability if peers
underestimate the TTR? Using Equation 1, we compute the
redundancy factor r, as a function of eTTR, that meets the
traget durability σ1. Then, using TTR and r, we compute the
data durability d. Figure 7 shows the impact of the relative
estimation error – from a precise evaluation of TTR up to
an error of almost twice the TTR – on the relative durability
error using the procedure described above, for different values
of τ and for w = 2 weeks. When τ is large, we have that
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Fig. 7. Correlation between estimation errors and data durability.
w + eTTR  τ : as such, even large estimation errors have
little impact on the durability d. Instead, when τ is small,
we have that w + eTTR ' τ : in this case, data durability is
more sensitive to estimation errors. As a consequence, data
redundancy may not be sufficient and data loss events may
occur.
In Table I, we illustrate the effects discussed by quantifying
data loss events for w = 2 weeks. Here we count the
percentage of peers that have not been able to restore their
data after a local disk crash, averaged over 10 simulation runs.
We break down the data loss cases between incomplete backup
and failed restore: the latter case encompasses all cases where
peers lose data after completing their backup. Furthermore,
we also specify the percentage of unavoidable cases in which
peers fail before minTTB: in this case, not even an ideal
system could have guaranteed a safe backup.
A lesson we can draw from Table I is that most data loss
episodes are simply due to node failure before the backup
is completed; this result confirms that it is sensible to op-
timize time to backup by reducing redundancy and hence
also network load. In addition, it can be noted that a large
10
TABLE I
CATEGORIZATION OF DATA LOSS EVENTS
Avg. lifetime Total Incomplete backup Failed
(τ ) events Total Unavoidable restore
3 months 13% 10.4% 8.4% 2.6%
1 year 2.6% 2.6% 2.3% None
4 years 0.5% 0.5% 0.25% None
majority of data loss episodes are unavoidable with any online
storage solution: nodes with low bandwidth risk crashing
before completing uploads even if saving data to a reliable
server with 100% uptime and unlimited bandwidth. “Failed
restore” events – present only in unstable systems with low τ
– are imputable to the impact of estimation error on durability,
at discussed above. However, we remark that the impact of
this effect even in such a situation is outnumbered by the
unavoidable data loss episodes; this leads us to conclude that
nodes with very low lifetime are intrinsically unsuited to any
kind of online storage solution, and not only to P2P backup.
VI. RELATED WORK
Redundancy rates and data repair techniques in P2P backup
systems have been investigated from various angles. Earlier
works [22], [23], [24] adopt simple replication strategies,
resulting in higher storage and bandwidth costs for backing
up and maintaining data in the system. In other proposals,
erasure coding is used in order to obtain high durability while
minimizing storage costs on nodes, but redundancy values are
fixed parameters that are chosen by the designer independently
of the system characteristics [25], [26]. The Wuala online
storage service encodes data on peers with a fixed redundancy
level and avoids the need for maintenance by storing a full
replica of the data in central servers [19]. More elaborate
policies belong to two different categories: in some cases [10],
[27], redundancy is determined as a function of node failure
rate in order to guarantee data durability at the expense of data
availability. Many other approaches (e.g., [5], [28]) guarantee
low latency through prompt data availability, but require high
redundancy rates in typical settings. In contrast with these
approaches, our proposal strives to provide both durability and
performance at a low redundancy cost, relaxing prompt data
availability by requiring that data becomes recoverable within
a given time window. Finally, Pamies-Juarez et al. [29] inves-
tigate the relationship between redundancy and data retrieval
times, but they center their investigations on cases where the
online session length duration is orders of magnitude shorter
than the length of a data transfer process; this scenario is
clearly not applicable to our case of long restore processes.
A complete system design requires considering several
problems that were not addressed in this paper; fortunately,
many of them have been tackled in the literature.
When a full system needs to be backed up, convergent
encryption [23], [24] can be used to avoid backing up duplicate
copies of the same file owned by different users.
Data maintenance is cheap in our scenario, where it is per-
formed by a data owner with a local copy. When maintenance
is delegated to nodes that do not have a local copy of the
backup objects, various coding schemes can be used [7], [8]
to limit the amount of required data transit. For these settings,
cryptographic protocols [30], [31] have been designed to verify
the authenticity of stored data.
A recurrent problem for P2P applications is guaranteeing
load balancing and creating incentives to encourage nodes in
contributing more resources. This can be done via reputation
systems [32] or virtual currency [33]. Specifically for storage
systems, an easy and efficient solution is segregating nodes in
sub-networks with roughly homogeneous characteristics such
as uptime and storage space [34], [35].
Backup objects, whose confidentiality can be ensured by
standard encryption techniques, should encode incremental
differences between archive versions. Various techniques have
been proposed to optimize computational time and size of
these differences [36].
It may happen that resources offered by peers are just not
sufficient to satisfy all user needs. In this case, a hybrid
peer-assisted system can be developed where data is stored
on a centralized data center and on peers. This can result
in scenarios having a performance comparable to centralized
systems, at a fraction of the costs [37].
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work we focused on P2P backup systems, and
designed a redundancy management mechanism tailored to
the specific data access patterns that characterize data backup.
The goal of our mechanism was to achieve data durability
without requiring large redundancy factors (typical of storage
applications) nor fast failure detection mechanisms.
Our experiments showed that, in a realistic setting, a redun-
dancy that caters to data durability can be less than half of what
is needed to guarantee availability. This results in a system
with a storage capacity that is more than doubled, and backup
operations that are much faster (up to a factor of 4) than on a
backup system based on traditional redundancy management.
This latter property is particularly desirable since, in most of
the cases, peers suffering data loss were those that could not
complete the backup before crashing.
We also showed that the price to pay for efficient backup
operations was a decreased (but controlled) performance of
restore operations. We argued that this was a reasonable
penalty, considering that all peers in the system would benefit
from backup efficiency, while only those peers suffering from
a failure would have to bear longer restore times.
Finally, we studied data loss events: our results indicated
that such events are practically negligible for a mature P2P
application in which permanent host failures dominate peer
deaths. We also showed the limitations of our technique for a
system characterized by a high application-level churn, which
is typical of new P2P applications that must conquer user trust.
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